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Interesting
The second comment by ‘Andy’ adds some helpful suggestions. The rest of the series should be interesting, too.
by haverecords on Aug 7, 2008 11:03 PM PDT 0 recs
it’s definitely a valid point, but I’m not sure if 30 will be any better. I imagine that would reduce the sample sie pretty drastically. Really, the number shouldn’t be picked arbitrarily. (I’m not saying I know how to arrive at it, but since the number is helping determine which closers get included in the data, an arbitrary number just isn’t good enough)
Billy Hayes: His job is better than yours.
by delorean on
Aug 7, 2008 11:10 PM PDT
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In the main I agree with you, but I don’t think picking 30 as opposed to 15 is arbitrary, as one can make a case for ‘30’ since it is less likely to be a fill in, etc. and thus the choice is made according to principle. The problem, as you pick out, is setting any set number, as it will exclude candidates that should be included—such as someone registering 29 saves.
What might help: going through the 220 candidates and attempting to establish something of a consensus of who belongs there, and who doesn’t. The criteria of inclusion would have to hammered out, but I suspect it could be. There would be some questionable and controversial cases, but not too many I suspect.
As for the criteria of inclusion: trying to establish a given player did in fact have that role, which will take some real historical work.
I also think it would be helpful to go through the said list and pick out the ‘established’ closers, as opposed to those just playing the role in a parasitic fashion (closer by committee, only one season at a high number). This might actually help to answer the question.
by haverecords on
Aug 7, 2008 11:42 PM PDT
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sounds solid
Billy Hayes: His job is better than yours.
by delorean on
Aug 7, 2008 11:57 PM PDT
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Enter Seidman
This should be a good study, if only for baseball nerd curiousty.
by Natto on Aug 7, 2008 11:08 PM PDT 0 recs
FWIW:
Brian Wilson: OPS against, BABIP.
High Leverage: .589 .294
Med Leverage: .720 .391
Low Leverage: .862 .367
At first, the OPS makes it look like Wilson certainly performs better in high leverage situations. However, looking a little deeper at the BABIP makes you wonder
A.) Is it a SSS fluke. There aren’t very many PA’s here. A couple balls that got down that shouldn’t have in low leverage situations would change the result significantly.
B.) Is it the defense? Brian Wilson already suffers from an “unlucky” BABIP overall (.337 vs. LD% of 15.6). Is it possible that the defense is just not trying as hard in low leverage situations, letting more balls drop for hits?
The argument that the closer himself is less focused, less intense during low leverage situations is one thing, and may or may not have a significant effect on the results of his pitching (a good pitcher is a good pitcher, regardless of situation – right?) But the argument that the team, as a whole, is playing more conservatively in low leverage (playing balls on a bounce v. diving, etc.) situations I think certainly holds water, and might factor into this more than one would originally think.
I had not considered this before…
BABIP in Save situations: .267 (which is dead nuts on xBABIP)
BABIP in non save: .486 – yikes!
Eugeniooooooo!!!!
by FairweatherFan on Aug 8, 2008 8:18 AM PDT 0 recs















